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PATTERNSAND DIFFUSION
OF CYCLICAL MOVEMENTS
IN THIS CHAPTER, the analysis of the behavior of manufacturers' or-
ders during business cycles is completed and is related to cyclical
changes in several variables representing production, the successive
stages of business investment, and financing. measures presented
refer to stages of general economic fluctuations. They are designed to
distill the major features of those changes in the processes described
that occur during expansions, downturns, contractions, and upturns
of the economy at large. The focus is on typical patterns, but in some
cases the deviations from them in individual historical episodes are
also examined. Attention is given particularly to certain factors that are
presumed to contribute to the early downturns and upturns in orders
and contracts for plant and equipment and in purchases of materials
and supplies.
In addition, in this chapter the diffusion of new orders is con-
sidered, that is, how the movements in them spread among the dif-
ferent industries during business expansions and contractions. This
analysis shows systematic early changes in the scope of the demand for
industrial products and how these changes are related to those in the
diffusion of production and some other activities.
Manufacturers' Orders and Production
During Business Cycles
Reference Cycle Patterns for Durable Goods Aggregates
Reference cycle patterns provide an instructive device for describ-
ing the movements of a series during business cycles. They are similarPatterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 589
to the specific-cycle patterns presented in Chapter 3, but are computed
for periods defined by major fluctuations in aggregate economic activity
rather than in the particular processes represented by the given series.'
Chart 12-1 presents the patterns for new orders received by durable
goods manufacturers. It is based on the three compilations of order
data described in the preceding chapter (see Chart 11-1 and the text)
and covers each of the nine business cycles of the four decades 1921—
61. As noted before, the data for the earlier years have a rather narrow
coverage, and this limits the comparability of interwar and postwar
patterns. A joint evaluation of these measures is thereby impaired but
not entirely invalidated.2
The huge movements of the thirties stand out conspicuously in two
of the patterns: The 1927—33 cycle is dominated by a long and steep
decline; and the 1933—38 cycle, by the protracted rise from the
nadir of the depression. The pattern for the war cycle, 1938—45, shows
another fluctuation of extraordinarily large amplitude. Although the ex-
pansion part of this cycle lasted eighty months and the contraction only
eight months, the rapid fall of orders in the latter phase matched the
amplitude of their rise in the former phase. Relative to their average
levels in each episode, new orders for durable goods fluctuated much
less during the other business cycles covered. However, their rises
during the early expansion stages in the cycle of 192 1—24 and again in
the two cycles of 1945—54 were vigorous enough; it was the ensuing
declines that were brief and shallow. Very mild fluctuations, with
shorter rises and longer declines, characterized the behavior of
durables orders in the 1924—27 cycle and the two recent cycles of
1954—61.
'Theseries is divided into segments, each of which covers one business ("reference") cycle
usually dated from the initial to the final trough. A pattern is computed for each of these successive
reference segments. It consists of nine figures+ one for each of the consecutive stages of the reference
cycle. Stages 1, V, and LX are three-month periods centered on the initial, middle, and terminal turns
of a business cycle, respectively. Stages II, Ill, and IV cover successive thirds of the expansion, and
stages VI, VII, and VIIIcoversimilar portions of the contraction. All measures are in "reference
cycle relatives"—percentages of the average standing of the data during the given business cycle.
Thus the construction of a reference cycle pattern is fully analogous to the construction of a specific-
cycle pattern (cf. Chapter 3, note 34). For full discussion of the method, see A. F. Burns and W. C.
Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, New York, NBER, 1946, pp. 160—70.
2 The Commerce-NBER index, mainly reflecting new orders for steel, lumber, and textile products,
covers the three cycles of 1921—33. Its behavior in 1929—33 resembled rather well the concurrent
behavior of the broader NICB index (Chart li-I). The NICB index is used in the pattern for the
1933—38 cycle, and the aggregative OBE-Census series cover the five cycles of 1938—61. (The NI CB
index for 1929—38 was linked to the ORE data, which go back to 1939, by converting the former to a
series in miLlions of current dollars through multiplication by a level-adjustment factor of 18.303.)
Considerable similarity is also observed in the movements of the NICB index and the OBE series
through most of their overlap period, that is, 1939—4 1.590 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
Chart 12-1 also confirms the familiar tendency of new orders for
durable goods to turn ahead of business cycle peaks and troughs, al-
though some of the leads observed in the monthly data are too short to
register as cycle stages. Leads of one to three stages account for six of
the nine comparisons at peaks, and leads of one to two stages account
for seven of the nine comparisons at troughs.3
The nine-point pattern computed by averaging the individual
reference cycle patterns of a series stage by stage is designed to bring
out the typical features in the behavior of the activity concerned dur-
ing the business cycle. The assumption of the procedure is that cyclical
behavior does have such persistent traits and that they are important;
the more valid this assumption is, the more useful the method.
Averages of the single-cycle patterns of new orders (N) of durable
goods manufacturers for three selected subperiods and for the total
period covered are shown in Chart 12-2, together with the correspond-
ing average patterns for production (Z).Thetypical expansion interval
for new orders covers stages VIII—IVineach case, which involves
one-stage leads at both peaks and troughs.4 The typical expansion
interval in production is I—V throughout, which means average simul-
taneous-stage timing in each subperiod. The correspondence of the
patterns for N and Zisimpressively close.
Since the specific-cycle amplitudes are typically larger for new
orders than for production, one may expect an analogous relationship
between the amplitudes of the average reference cycle patterns; but
this need not be so, because of timing differences. The average pattern
for the postwar cycles in new orders does have a larger rise-and-faIl
amplitude than its counterpart for production (the figures in reference
cycle relatives are 57 and 47, respectively). In some of the earlier
cycles this does not hold, but this could be because the series do not
strictly correspond.
Comprehensive coverage of manufacturers' unfilled orders is avail-
It should be clear that the reference cycle patterns can provide only a general picture of how the
major fluctuations in a given series are timed relative to the business cycles, and a rather imprecise
and difficult-to-interpret picture at that. This is because the reference cycle stages are often too long
for a sensitive timing analysis and, particularly, because they differ in duration as do the individual
business cycles. Measures in fixed calendar-time units are therefore definitely preferable for timing
studies, and my use of reference cycle patterns for this purpose is strictly peripheral.
the I 945—49cycle, whichincludes the eañy postwar reconversion period, is excluded, a
two-stage lead at the peak is obtained in the average pattern for 1949—61 (i.e., the typical expansion
interval for the most recent cycles is Vill—ILI).Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 591
Chart12-1
Reference Cycle Patterns in Value of New Orders Received
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ableonly for the post-World War II period. Chart 12-3 shows the be-
havior of total backlogs of durable goods orders in the four reference
cycles of the period 1945—61. The patterns characteristically increase
in stages I—IV (but the expansion phase includes only stages 1—111in
the 1945—49 cycle and only stages I1—IV in the 1958—61 cycle). As a
corollary, declines in the patterns typically extend at least through the
interval between stages IV and IX.
The facts implied by these diagrams have already been encountered
earlier in this study, although they were brought out by different592 Ordersand Related Processes During Business Cycles
Chart 12-2
Average Reference Cycle Patterns in New Orders and
Production of Durable Goods Manufacturers,





methodsand in different forms. Clearly, backlogs of durables orders
turned down early at the recent business recessions. Here it is shown
that their leads amounted to one or two long expansion stages. At
troughs, the timing of the backlogs was in these terms coincident. The
patterns retain the intracycle trends, which were downward in the
first and last of these episodes. Their amplitudes are large, except for
the 1958—61 cycle.
4 cycles, 1945-61
MonthsPatterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 593
Chart 12-3
Reference Cycle Patterns in Manufacturers' Unfilled











SummaryMeasures for Selected Products
Chart 12-4 presents average reference patterns for twenty-six series
on new orders, production, and shipments, divided into eleven groups
for as many commodities. Comparability is assured in that the graphs
for the same product cover the same business cycles. The data are for
1919—38. The horizontal scales are drawn up uniformly, ignoring the
differences in duration between the cycles covered by the averages.594 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
Chart 12-4
Average Reference Cycle Patterns in New Orders, Production, and





















































120Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 595
A close look at the chart reveals that in most cases new orders ex-
ceed shipments and production in the average amplitude of their move-
ments during business cycles (all patterns are drawn to the same verti-
cal scale). In some instances the differences are very pronounced, in
others small (e.g., compare the patterns for locomotives with those for
steel sheets). The patterns on the left-hand side of the chart have larger
amplitudes on the whole than those on the right. The left-hand pat-
terns represent in part goods made largely to the specifications of in-
dustrial buyers and in part heavy equipment produced only upon ad-
vance orders. Those on the right represent staples made for sale to
builders.
Numerical measures supporting the visual impressions conveyed by
Chart 12-4 are presented in Table 12-1. The average reference cycle
amplitude (column 3) is computed from the standings of the series in
its typical trough and peak stages, as identified in columnThis figure
is in each case smaller than the corresponding measure of the average
specific-cycle amplitude (cf. columns 3 and 4). The ratios of the two
measures (column 5) roughly indicate the closeness of the relation in
time between the specific cycles of a series and the cycles in general
business.
Fluctuations in new orders exceed those in shipments and produc-
tion not only in specific-cycle but also in reference cycle measurements
(columns 6 and 7). The three exceptions to this rule (lines 10, 14, and
15) can be traced to loose relationships between the business cycles
and specific cycles of the series involved.
Comparisons of the typical expansion intervals in column 2 indicate
that new orders for railroad equipment and metal products, which are
made to order, led production and shipments by one or two (in one case
by three) reference stages. On the other hand, the timing of new orders
for the staples used in construction (lines 13—24) was in terms of the
reference cycle stages coincident with the timing of output and de-
liveries.6
Each entry in column 3 is the sum of two average amplitude measures, one for the phase matched
with expansions and the other for the phase matched with contractions, with signs disregarded. Cf.
Wesley C. Mitchell,WhatHappens During Business Cycles:A Progress Report, NewYork, NBER,
1951,pp. 51—52and100—102.
6 Accordingto Table 12-I, column 2, eight types of division of reference cycles into "expansion"
and "contraction" are found for the series included (the total number of possible divisions in 24; of
the schemes that are not represented, all but four indicate typical lagsatbusiness revivals and/or
recessions). Itisclear from these calculations that all new-order series lead at both peaks and






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9598 Ordersand Related Processes During Business Cycles
Notes toTable 12-1
9Thesame series are included as in Chart 12-3, except for new orders and shipments
of miscellaneous enameled sanitary ware (each of these series covers one complete
specific cycle only). The longest reference cycle period covered by each of the series
(new orders, shipments and, wherever available, production) relating to the same com-
modity is the one shown. The number of cycles covered is shown in parentheses.
bThespecific-cycle periods listed are those that best match the reference cycle
period for the given commodity. The number of cycles covered is shown in parentheses.
cEachexpansion interval is based on the patterns for all reference cycles covered by
the given series (as of the time the series was analyzed in the business cycle unit of
the National Bureau). The intervals for the following series are based on longer
periods than those listed in the table.
New orders: Railroad freight cars, 1879—1938, 16 reference cycles (the expansion
interval for the six reference cycles, 1914—38, is also VIII—IV, however); railroad
passenger cars, 1870—1938, 17 reference cycles; railroad locomotives, 1879—1938, 16
reference cycles; oak flooring, 1914—38, 6 reference cycles.
Shipments. Oak flooring, 1914—38, 6 reference cycles.
Production: Oak flooring, 1919—49, 7 reference cycles.
tiBasedon the reference-cycle periods listed in the table beside the commodity
name.
eBasedon the specific-cycle periods listed in column 1.
Percentage ratio of the corresponding entries in columns 3 and 4. [= (average
reference cycle amplitude ÷ average specific-cycle amplitude) X 100].
Average reference cycle amplitude of shipments or production as percentage of
average reference cycle amplitude of new orders. Based on corresponding entries in
column 3.
hAveragespecific-cycle amplitude of shipments or production as percentage of
average specific-cycle amplitude of new orders. Based on corresponding entries in
column 4.
For additional historical perspective, Chart 12-5 shows the reference
cycle patterns for unfilled orders of the U.S. Steel Corporation and for
steel ingot production, 1904—33. These patterns indicate that new or-
ders for steel must have been increasing in each expansion and de-
creasing in each contraction at rates substantially exceeding those of
output and shipments. The change in backlogs of steel orders was
typically positive in expansions and negative in contractions, and
these cyclical movements were usually large. This confirms the familiar
thesis that the effective demand for steel has long been very sensitive
to fluctuations in aggregate economic activity.
The steel industry produces thousands of products, most of which
are made according to buyers' specifications regarding shape, dimen-
sion, and chemical composition. To the diversity of these made-to-
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Chart12-5
Reference Cycle Patterns in Unfilled Orders of U.S. Steel Corporation
and in Steel Ingot Production, 1904—3 3

































12 243648600 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
terms including delivery periods. The movements of quantities de-
manded and produced are no doubt far from simultaneous for these dif-
ferent products; yet their confluence is apparently pronounced, judg-
ing from the large amplitudes of the aggregate patterns. At certain
times, steel users buy well beyond their current production require-
ments and build up large stocks; steel output rises then, but typically
not fast enough to prevent an expansion in steel order backlogs. In
contrast to these boom developments, users' stocks are liquidated dur-
ing a slump, and current orders shrink; production is cut back, though
not as much, eating into the accumulated orders on hand.
The paired patterns in Chart 12-5 show substantial similarity, re-
flecting the high correlation between unfilled orders and production of
steel during each successive cycle. This can be observed very dis-
tinctly in the chart, because the patterns for either series vary con-
siderably between the different cycles covered. The timing of the two
variables in terms of reference cycle stages was most often syn-
chronous, but production clearly lagged behind backlogs at the peak of
the 1914—19 cycle and at both the peak and terminal trough of the
1924—27 cycle. The lag at the height of the large backlog accumulation
during World War I was notably long. The reference cycle amplitudes
were larger for unfilled orders than for production in the five cycles
during 1904—21, but the opposite is true for the last three cycles
covered (192 1—33). In particular, steel ingot output fluctuated much
more than U.S. Steel backlogs (relative to their respective cycle bases)
in 1927—33. These results are presumably connected with the trend
toward hand-to-mouth buying in the twenties and the associated de-
crease in the size and role of the backlogs.
Diffusion of Changes in New Orders and Production
Timing analysis reveals that various series on new orders tend to
expand and contract at about the same time and in conformity to the
movements of the economy at large. Yet considerable dispersion
among the corresponding turning points in these series is also evident.
Thus cyclical movements in new orders become widely diffused
throughout the manufacturing sector of the economy, but it takes time
for them to spread from one commodity, firm, industry, or region to
another.Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 601
How they spread can be summarized by means of diffusion indexes,
which can be constructed in various ways. A simple measure of dif-
fusion records only the direction, and not the magnitude, of changes in
the component series. It shows in percentage form how many of these
series expand at a given time. Two methods of determining when a
series is expanding are in use: (1) Historically, specific-cycle expan-
sions and contractions in the series can be dated and used; or, (2) on
a more current basis, rises in moving averages of the series can be de-
fined as expansions; and falls, as contractions. Each method presents
its own problems and has its own limitations.7
Diffusion indexes based on series that reach their peaks and troughs
in the vicinity of downturns and upturns in aggregate economic activity
(and not much later) persistently lead at these business revivals and re-
cessions, although by variable intervals.8 Clearly, a diffusion index
built from series which lead the reference dates (e.g., new orders)
should itself show longer leads than an index representing tardier ac-
tivities (e.g., production or shipments).
Many diffusion indexes based on short-period moving averages are
very choppy. This occurs clearly in indexes computed from data with
large, short fluctuations, such as the individual new-order series.
Cumulation provides an effective way of suppressing the smaller ir-
regular movements and bringing out the larger cyclical movements in
these diffusion indexes. To be sure, the method also reduces substan-
In an historical index (I), a positively conforming series is said to expand in each month that falls
between a specific trough and a specific peak in the data; it is said to contract in each month
situated between a peak and a trough. This is a simple principle designed radically to smooth out all
movements shorter than cyclical, but dating the specific cycles often involves considerable uncer-
tainty. The alternative (2) is to smooth the seasonally adjusted component series by means of
moving averages, so as to reduce their irregular, and bring out their cyclical, components. Month-
to-monthincreasesor decreases in the smoothed series would then be taken to indicate cyclical
expansion and contraction.
For further explanation of these and other measures of diffusion, and applications to new orders
and related data, see Victor Zarnowitz, "The Timing of Manufacturers' Orders During Business
Cycles." in Geoffrey II.Moore.ed.. Business Indienwrs.PrincetonforNHER. 1961, Vol. I,
pp.459—73.
'Sometime prior to the culmination of business expansion the percentage of series reaching
peaks begins to exceed the percentage of series reaching troughs, and when this develops the propor-
tion of series expanding starts declining. It does not turn up again until the percentage reaching
troughs exceeds that reaching peaks, which happens some time before the central month of the
business contraction. This explains the diffusion lead in general terms. Depending on the duration of
the "zones" of peaks and troughs and the graduation of the transitions between them, indexes of
diffusion will show more or less continuous cyclical fluctuations. See Arthur F. Burns, "New Facts
on Business Cycles," in Moore, ed., BusinessCycle indicators, Vol.1, pp. 13—44.602 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
tially the leads of the indexes at business cycle turns.9 Nevertheless,
the diffusion indexes of new orders retain a comfortable lead even
after cumulation, as illustrated in Chart 12-6.
The first curve in this chart represents an index based on Commerce
series on new orders for twenty-three manufacturing industries. The
second shows the diffusion of changes in twenty-four components of
the Federal Reserve Board index of industrial production.1° The
strong difference in trends between the two curves is due to technical
factors and is of no real interest.1' The indicated one-to-one corre-
spondence between the diffusion cycles in new orders and production,
however, is confirmed by other measures, and I am prepared to accept
it as a "real" and significant phenomenon. The movements of new
orders preceded those of output at peaks, with leads ranging from two
to six months and averaging four. At troughs, the timing of the two in-
dexes was nearly synchronous. It is possible that these comparisons
somewhat understate the diffusion index lead of new orders relative to
production.12
The third and fourth curves in Chart 12-6 record the results of the
monthly business survey of the National Association of Purchasing
Agents (NAPA) on new orders and production. These indexes are
based on 200—225 member reports that reflect in general the condi-
tions in the firms with which the respondents are associated; they are
presumably directly comparable, being compiled from materials with a
The cumulated figures are derived by taking the deviations of percentage expandingfrom 50,or
the deviations of the average duration of run from 0, and adding each month's deviation to the sum of
the deviations for all preceding months. Hence the peaks in the cumulated figures occur when the
deviations shift from positive to negative, and the troughs when they shift from negative to positive.
10The production series cover tendurablegoods and ten nondurable goods industries as well as
four minerals; consequently, the combined weight of the durables is much less here than in the new-
order index, which includes the series for the nondurable goods aggregates with and without un-
filled orders but mainly reflects the behavior of durables. Month-to-month changes in seasonally
adjusted production series (1957—59= 100)are used, whereas three-month moving averages are ap-
plied to the more volatile new-order series.
"In the early fifties, new orders contracted while production experienced only a temporary re-
tardation in several industries. Thus the percentage expanding of the new-order series declined below
50 more often in 1951thandid the corresponding measure for the output series, and then, in 1952—
53, exceededthat level by smaller margins. This accounts for the stronger upward trend in the
output index compared to the new-order index.
12Thefigures for new orders involve considerable smoothing, while those for production do not.
One effect of smoothing is to shift the turning points to later dates, thereby reducing the length of
the measured leads compared to the true leads. In earlier work, I used somewhat differently con-
structed indexes of cumulated percentage expanding, which yielded short leads of new orders vis-
à-vis output at troughs as well as peaks (see Moore, ed., BusinessCycle Indicators, Vol.1, pp. 470—
73, with Chart 14.9 and Table 14.11).Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 603
Chart 12-6
Cumulated Percentage Expanding and Aggregative Series, New Orders
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Note:Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expansions. Dots
identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles; circles, minor turns or retardations.
aBasedon three-month moving averages.
bBasedon month-to-month change.
cSix-monthmoving average centered.604 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
Table 12-2
Timing of Cumulated Diffusion Indexes and
Aggregates of New Orders and Production,
All Manufacturing Industries, 1949—61
[lead (—)orlag (+),inmonths]
Date of Business











Cycle Turn (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trough Oct. 1949 —3 —4 —3 —3 5 0
PeakJuly1953 —3 —3 0 0 —4 0
Trough Aug. 1954 —6 —7 —7 —6 —7 —4
PeakJuly1957 —6 —1 0 —l —8 —5
Trough Apr. 1958 —2 0 0 0 —1 0
PeakMay 1960 —4 —2 +1 —2 —12 4
Trough Feb. 1961 —1 0 —1 0 —1 1
Average timing
Peaks —4.3 —2.0 +0.3 —1.0 —8.0 —3.0
Troughs —3.0 —2.8 —2.8 —2.2 —3.5 —1.2
All turns —3.6 —2.4 —1.4 —1.7 —5.4 —2.0
a Basedon three-month moving averages of 23 seasonally adjusted series.
bComputedfrom diffusion data yielded by the Monthly Business Survey of the Na-
tional Association of Purchasing Agents, after seasonal adjustment.
Based on month-to-month changes in 24 seasonally adjusted series for the major-
industry components of the FRB index of industrial production.
dSix-monthmoving averages centered on the fourth month. The average lead of un-
smoothed data for 1949—61 for all turns is a little longer (6.0 months as compared with
5.4 months in the table).
common source, in the same ways (unsmoothed) and for the same time
spans (monthly).13
The NAPA indexes are very smooth and show well-defined cyclical
indexes show thecumulatedpercentage of survey participants reporting an increase plus
halfthepercentage reporting no change from the previous month. The maineffect of this treatment
hereis to raise the level of the figures being cumulated without appreciably altering their cyclical
pattern, because the "no change" answers, while often very numerous, constitute a relatively stable
series. Two other features of these data may be noted. First, the findings of the NAPA survey are
available very early, even before the end of the report month. Second, the seasonal components are
very weak in these data, although the survey replies are not explicitly adjusted for seasonal varia-
tion. (The series in Chart 12.6 are adjusted; see ibid., p. 471, Chart 14.9, for graphs of unadjusted
indexes, 1948—58.)Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 605
movementsin general conformity to the chronology of the concurrent
business fluctuations. However, they closely resemble each other in a
way that is difficult to explain or accept as plausible, especially since
durable goods manufacturers are well represented in the NAPA sur-
veys. The turning points in the two indexes have been simultaneous
since 1954, and the timing of new orders was occasionally sluggish.
Chart 12-6 also demonstrates the close parallelism between cumu-
lated diffusion indexes for new orders and production and the corre-
sponding aggregates. The comparisons, whether for new orders or pro-
duction, confirm other evidence of high correlations between the scope
and the over-all magnitude of cyclical movements in economic aggre-
gates.14
Table 12-2 shows the timing of each of the six series included in
Chart 12-6 at each successive business turn. According to the Com-
merce data, both the cumulated percentage expanding and the aggre-
gate of new orders led on each occasion (columns 1 and 5). The FRB
data for production, on the other hand, show coincidences or shorter
leads at most turns, again both for the cumulated diffusion index and
the aggregate (columns 3 and 6). Short leads and coincidences also
dominate the timing of the NAPA indexes, where the differences be-
tween new orders and production are few and small (columns 2 and 4).
Cyclical Behavior of Investment
Commitments and Realizations
New Orders, Construction, and Expenditures for Plant and
Equipment
The series on new investment orders and contracts discussed in
Chapters 9 and 10 make it possible to construct reference cycle pat-
terns of business commitments on capital account for three complete
cycles, 1949—61. Chart 12-7 compares the behavior of the two com-
ponents of these commitments. It shows that new orders for producer
durable equipment and the contracts for industrial and commercial
plant construction had rather different patterns of change during the
The burden of proof here is on the Commerce and FRB data, since surveys concerned only with
directions of change (such as those of the NAPA) provide no basis for any meaningful aggregation.
See ibid.,pp.465—66,withChart 14.7, for a comparison of interwar data in the same form.606 Orders and ReLated Processes During Business Cycles
Chart 12-7
Reference Cycle Patterns in Value of New Orders for
Producers' Durable Equipment and of Commercial
and Industrial Building Contracts, 1949—61
New orders for producers' durable equipment (N)







recent business cycles. Contracts ran high early in the contractions of
the 1949—54 and 1958—61 cycles. Equipment orders increased faster
than plant contracts in the early recovery stages of these cycles, and
declined earlier to reach trough levels in mid-contraction—just when
contracts were very high. In the 1954—58 cycle, however, the be-
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terns for 1949—6 1, the expansion periods were stages 1—VI for plant
contracts and Vu—hi for equipment orders.
Monthly figures on construction contracts are highly erratic (see
Chart 9-1, above), and even averages based on them are occasionally
strongly affected by chance concentrations of large contracts. The
averages based on a few monthly values would presumably be es-
pecially prone to such random influences, and the contraction stages
are typically short in mild or moderate cycles such as those examined
here. There may be little more than this to the peculiar peaks in the
patterns for the value of contracts in the contractions of 195 3—54 and
1960—61. Since 1919, both commercial and industrial building con-
tracts have led business cycle peaks by 5—6 months and troughs by 1—2
months, on the average. The combined value aggregate had mean leads
of 4 months at peaks and 2.8 months at troughs.15
Contracts for factory, business office, or store construction are, of
course, influenced by financial market conditions and other cost ele-
ments as well as by demand factors, though they appear to be less
sensitive to the former and more to the latter than are the contracts for
residential construction. Historically, long-term interest rates have
lagged, as have building costs. Hence, late expansion and the begin-
ning of contraction are unfavorable cycle stages for construction
starts, and late contraction and the beginning of expansion are
favorable. These are presumably important reasons for the tendency
of contracts to lead. Indeed, residential construction contracts or starts
have led by such long intervals at some recent business peaks that
much of the time they followed a countercyclical course. This behavior
has been attributed in the literature to the high sensitivity of the hous-
ing market to the supply of mortgage credit. But the leads in industrial
and commercial building contracts were much shorter and traces of
inverted behavior much weaker than in the residential sector. The big
companies that account for the major share of industrial building
generate large cash flows of their own and are particularly valuable
customers of financial institutions, with high credit ratings and ample
monthly figures are somewhat less erratic for floor space than for the value estimates of the
contracts, and it is the former series that is included in the National Bureau list of "leading indica-
tors." For the timing record of commercial and industrial contracts (floor space) in the period
19 19—59, see ibid., App. B. A comprehensive compilation of the principal time series on construc-
tion, including the contracts data, is provided in Robert E. Lipsey and Doris Preston, SourceBook
ofStatistics Relating to Construction,NewYork, NBER, 1966.608 Orders and ReLated Processes During Business Cycles
access to loanable funds most of the time. They are likely to be less de-
terred by high and rising costs of building and financing than the smaller
decision-making units that are active in the residential construction
field, and may have stronger motivations against retrenchment.16
Chart 12-8 compares new orders for producer durable equipment
with the corresponding aggregate for shipments. While equipment
orders had their highest standing in stage III or IV, shipments had
theirs in stage V. Usually, the lowest values for orders fell in stages
Vii and VIII; the lowest values for shipments, in stages VIII and IX.
In the average patterns, the expansion period for orders is Vu—hI
(indicating two-stage leads at peaks and troughs), while the expansion
period for shipments is I—V (coincident timing).
When contracts for industrial and commercial plant (including pri-
vately owned utilities) are added to equipment orders, the patterns for
the resulting estimates of aggregate fixed-investment commitments
(OC) differ but slightly from those computed for only the equipment
component (N), as shown by the corresponding patterns in the first
two columns of diagrams in Chart 12-8. This similarity reflects the
heavy weight of equipment in OC and is somewhat reduced when the
reweighted aggregate OCr is used instead. Even then, however, a con-
siderable family resemblance between these diagrams remains, which
presumably testifies to the genuinely large importance of the equipment
component within the aggregate of fixed-investment commitments of
business.
The value-of-output counterpart to the combined orders-contracts
series for plant and equipment is compiled by adding to shipments of
equipment-producing manufacturers the value of industrial, commer-
cial, and privately owned utilities construction put in place. Here again
the inclusion of the construction estimates apparently has remarkably
weak effects, since the S and OC patterns in the first and second
161nanearly (about 1936)unpublished manuscript on building construction, Arthur F. Burns sug-
gested the following reasons for the observed difference in timing: (I) Costs of building and financ-
ing usually form a smaller part of total costs for an industrial firm than in residential construction.
(2) The incentive to expand plant capacity is greater than the incentive to expand housing capacity,
because commodity prices tend to rise faster than rents during a cyclical expansion. (3) The capacity
of an industrial plant can typically be modified by changes in the intensity of utilization, whereas the
capacity of a house is relatively well defined and less adjustable. Other, more speculative reasons
were also mentioned, namely, (4) potential long-run losses of customers' business due to inadequate
plant are of greater concern to an industrial company than to an apartment house owner; and(5) big
firms, which account for a relatively large proportion of industrial building, often move more slug-






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1610 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
columns of Chart 12-8 are very similar. Yet there must be much less
of an undercoverage bias on the construction side in this aggregate of
investment realization than in the commitments series, since figures for
the value of construction put in place give better representation to the
plant component than do the building contracts data.'7
The diagrams on the right-hand side of Chart 12-8 reproduce the
patterns for investment orders and contracts and compare them with
the patterns for business expenditures on plant and equipment. The
behavior of the latter in each of the three cycles since 1949 has been
remarkably similar to the behavior of the value-of-investment series,
i.e., the combined aggregate of equipment shipments and construction
put in place (cf. the second and third columns of diagrams in the
chart). There are several slight lags of expenditures relative to the
value of investment goods output, each of one short stage adjoining the
business turn (at the peak of 1953 and the troughs of 1954, 1958, and
1961). Some lags of this sort would be expected. The average patterns
of the two series, however, hardly differ. This appears sensible, since
expenditures on plant and equipment should be closely correlated with
the value of output of the capital goods covered. However, there is no
reason for the overrepresentation of equipment relative to plant outlays
(or vice versa) in the expenditure series. The value-of-output esti-
mates presumably do have this bias, but the similarity of their cyclical
behavior to that of expenditures seems to suggest that in this case the
bias is not very disturbing.
According to the average patterns (lower-right diagram in Chart
12-8), new orders and contracts for plant and equipment led at both
peaks and troughs of the business cycle by two stages (expansion
period Vu—hI), while business fixed-investment outlays tended to
coincide (expansion period I-V). Actually, the typical timing of plant
and equipment expenditures differs from that of investment orders
even more than this measurement in reference cycle stages would sug-
gest. Turns in quarterly data for expenditures tend to lag behind busi-
ness cycle peaks and troughs by short intervals (Chart 9-2).
Both new orders for equipment and business construction contracts
usually decline well below their average cyclical levels during contrac-
tions in aggregate economic activity (i.e., they fall below the base line
"Althoughit should be noted, too, that the use of shipments instead of orders data does nothing
to correct any overstatement bias on the equipment side.Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 611
of 100 in our diagrams). In contrast, the value of plant and equipment
produced and of expenditures on plant and equipment held up well in
the mild postwar recessions. The rise-and-fall amplitude in the pat-
terns is considerably larger for new orders and contracts than for the
corresponding expenditures or shipments. For example, the averages
in reference cycle relatives for 1949—61 are 56 for capital orders and
43 for expenditures.
The Evidence of Historical Series
For the years before World War II, quarterly estimates of plant and
equipment expenditures by manufacturers are available, but there is no
series on aggregate investment orders. Therefore, the patterns for
Chawner's expenditure series 18 are compared with those for the early
Commerce-NBER index of orders for durables, 1921—33, and the
NICB index of new orders for durable goods, 1933—3 8 (Chart 12-9). In
the two weak cycles of 1921 —27 manufacturers' capital outlays for
productive facilities typically expanded in stages I—V, showing the
same type of average coincident timing as the postwar capital outlays
of private nonagricultural business enterprises. In the mild contrac-
tions of 1923—24 and 1926—27 and in the sharp but short contraction of
1937—38, manufacturers' expenditures for plant and equipment dipped
only slightly below the base line in the immediate vicinity of the
terminal trough. This feature, too, broadly recalls the behavior of busi-
ness capital outlays during the postwar recessions, although investment
generally displayed more strength on the later occasions.
The one-stage leads of durables orders are already familiar. The
average amplitude of rise and fall was less in these orders than in manu-
facturers' plant and equipment expenditures. This is probably due to
the heavy weight in the orders figures of nonequipment items with
smaller cyclical amplitudes, as well as to the use of physical rather
than current-value series in the earlier orders index. These estimates
of new orders for durable goods are after all far from perfect as a proxy
for producer equipment orders.
Chart 12-9 also includes the patterns for the value of commercial
18U.S.Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. See Lowell J.
Chawner, "Capital ExpendituresforManufacturing Plant and Equipment— 1915 to 1940," Survey
ofCurrentBusiness, March1941, pp. 9—15, and further descriptions in ibid.,December1961 and
May 1962.612 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
Chart 12-9
Average Reference Cycle Patterns in New Orders for Durable
Goods, Value of Commercial and Industrial Building
Contracts, and Expenditures on Plant and
Equipment, 1921—27 and 1927—38
Plants and equipment expenditures, manufacturing, Chawner (I)
Index of new orders, durable manufactures, Commerce—NBER (N)
Value of commercial and industrial building contracts, Dodge (C)
and industrial building contracts for the same groupings of interwar
business cycles. Here the typical trough-peak-trough stages are
I-V-IX, the same coincident timing as that of expenditures. More sensi-
tive comparisons in monthly terms would be necessary to reveal a
tendency for the contracts to lead by short intervals.
It is possible that new investment orders placed with manufacturers
had shorter and less regular leads at business cycle turns in the inter-
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the peaks and omitting the two cycles in 192 1—27, by comparisons of
the patterns for the durable goods orders in Chart 12-1, and also, as a
broad approximation, by Charts 12-8 and 12-9. Further evidence
comes from new orders for machine tools, for which a relatively long
and continuous series is available, which enjoyed early recognition as
one of the timeliest indicators of the demand for capital goods.
As shown in Chart 12-10, the demand for machine tools (which, of
course, are produced largely to specific orders) has a very high degree
of cyclical conformity and sensitivity. The patterns bring out well the
contrast between investment behavior in mild cycles (such as 1921—24,
1924—27, and 1958—6 1) and in other cycles including the most severe
ones in 1919—21 and the 1930's.
When the five interwar patterns are combined into one by averaging,
an almost symmetrical inverted V pattern is obtained, but this is be-
cause the large rises in some of these cycles are nearly balanced by
large declines in others. A coincident timing of machine-tool orders
at peaks and troughs in general economic activity is suggested. Ac-
tually, the analysis of monthly data reveals a slight prevalence of leads
over coincidences, but the leads are mostly too short (1—2 months) to
show up in longer units such as the reference stages (see Table 11-5,
lines 47—48).
The patterns for the postwar cycles have a considerably different
appearance. The first one (1945—49) is dominated by a downward
trend because of the discontinuation of high wartime demand, but it
already shows a distinct lead of orders at the terminal trough. The
1949—54 and the 1954—58 patterns both have sharp peaks in stage III
—two stages before the business downturn—and both show retarda-
tions before the troughs. The pattern for the 1958—61 cycle is flatter
and less regular, but it suggests a similar lead at the peak. Short leads
at the troughs of 1954 and 1961 are also visible in these schematized
pictures. According to the average pattern for the four postwar cycles,
1945—61, the typical expansion interval for machine-tool orders in this
period consisted of stages VILI—Ill.
If the leads at business cycle peaks of new orders placed with manu-
facturers increased since World War II compared with the interwar
period, two factors may be responsible: (1) Production and shipments
of the goods ordered may have acquired leads or longer leads at the
recent recessions. The importance of manufacturing has declined;614 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
Chart 12-10
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therefore, a downturn in the output of this sector no longer has the
prompt and strongly depressing effect upon the economy it used to
have. (2) The lags of output and deliveries behind new orders may have
lengthened because of greater backlog accumulations in the postwar
expansions. The first effect is a structural and presumably long-lasting
one. The cyclical role of investment is affected to the extent that capital
goods are supplied by the manufacturing sector. The second effect is
cyclical, depending on the intensity of demand during the preceding ex-
pansion. It is particularly important for investment, since capital goods
are produced largely to order, with substantial but variable delivery
periods. In the 1940's and 1950's both factors became effective, but
there is of course no necessary link between them.
The long leads of machine-tool orders at the postwar recessions can
be traced mainly to extensions of the delivery periods, as revealed by
the increase in the lags of shipments behind new orders. The timing of
machine-tool shipments tends to be roughly coincident, with some
tendency toward short leads at business recessions and short lags at
revivals.19
Fluctuations in Orders, Profits, and Investment
Purchases of Durable Goods and Corporate Profits
One of the factors that may account for the early decline in aggregate
new orders during business expansions is the deterioration, from the
viewpoint of those who place the orders, of the cost-price relations.2°
Changes in corporate profits after taxes reflect the net over-all effect of
changes in cost-price differentials but depend also on changes in the
volume of transactions.
According to quarterly estimates by Harold Barger,21 net corporate
profits coincided at two peaks and led at two peaks in the period
1923—37, yielding an average lead of two months. New orders for
durable goods (NBER-Commerce and NICB) had leads at all four
summary measures in monthly terms, see Table 11-9, line 8. At the first three postwar reces-
sions, shipments also reached their top levels at least several months ahead of the measures of aggre-
gate economic activity. However, this factor appears definitely less important in accounting for the
long leads of new orders than does the factor of extended delivery periods.
20 Cf. Geoffrey H. Moore, "Leading and Confirming Indicators of General Business Changes," in
Moore, ed., Business Cycle Indicators, p. 65.
21 Outlayand Income in the United States, 1921—38, New York, NBER, 1942, pp.297—99.
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peaks, which averaged six months. However, in the postwar period,
for which more comprehensive and reliable data are available from the
Commerce Department, the lead of orders at turns in profits implied in
the earlier comparisons disappears and may even be slightly reversed.
Both series led at each of the four recessions of 1948—60, and profits
showed longer leads on three of these occasions; but the differences be-
tween these measures were mostly small and the mean leads closely
similar (8 months for profits and 7.5 months for orders).
Profits, like new orders, also led at business recoveries. In the inter-
war period, the mean leads at troughs differed very little from those at
peaks for both variables; again, orders turned earlier in most cases. At
the four postwar recoveries, 1949—61, profits led three times and coin-
cided once. New orders led four times, twice by slightly shorter inter-
vals than profits. The mean leads in this period were 4 months for
profits and 3.5 months for orders.22
Chart 12-1 1indicates that a close positive association exists be-
tween purchases of durables —mainlymaterials inputs and producer
equipment —andtotal net profits of what is no doubt the major group
of purchasers, namely, U.S. corporations. Certainly the similarity of
reference cycle patterns in new orders for durable goods and in cor-
porate profits for the two most recent cycles (1954—61) is striking. In
the two earlier cycles (1945—54), there are larger divergences between
these patterns, but the correspondence is still very marked. It is, in fact,
more pronounced than would appear from cycle-stage averages, be-
cause in the early fifties both orders and profits had a double-peak pat-
tern, which in Chart 12-11 is visible only in profits. According to the
diagrams, profits led orders at the 1948 peak and the early downturns
in the Korean period, and lagged slightly at the revival of 1961 (all
these are one-stage timing differences). At the other revivals covered,
in 1949, 1954, and 1958, as welt as the recessions of 1957 and 1960,
the two series turned in the same business cycle stage.23
Of course, even a very high correlation does not necessarily denote
a meaningful direct association. Thus, new orders and profits could
both be jointly determined by some third factor, e.g., sales of the
ordering firms. Furthermore, should the association be in fact a direct
22Fora detailed record of leads and lags of these series through 1948, see Moore, ed., Business
Cycle Indicators, Vol.1,App.B.
23Fora graph of corporate profits after taxes, seasonally adjusted, 1948—6 1, see Chart 10-4.Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 617
Chart 12-11
Reference Cycle Patterns in New Orders for Durable
Goods and Corporate Profits After Taxes, 1945—61
one, the familiar problem of the direction of causation must be faced.
Rising profits may stimulate orders; but rising orders, too, may have
strong stimulating effects and lead to higher levels of activity and
higher profits.
Mutual interaction in partnership with other important factors is no
doubt the broadest and, hence, the most accommodating concept for
this relation (as for so many others), but to acknowledge this does not
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What is suggested, rather, is that a search for such connections here
is likely to be difficult. Cyclical developments are cumulative, and fac-
tors involved in them may alternate in the roles of "cause" and
"effect," depending on the span of time considered or the stage of
the process. If this is the case, timing comparisons, which sometimes
provide helpful clues to the direction of causation, are apt to give
mixed results of limited informational value. At least, however, it is
clear that the cyclical movements in orders and profits are closely cor-
related; the relationship is important and it deserves further explora-
tion, especially in the context of the determination of investment
(Chapter 10).
Profit Variables and Investment Commitments
The chain of influence running from profits to orders is widely be-
lieved to be particularly important for investment goods. The decision
to invest depends on the profits expected from the contemplated in-
vestment —thismuch is neither questioned nor as such is an opera-
tional statement. The expected profits depend on the demand for the
products concerned, on the technologically determined capital re-
quirements (production function), and the relative prices of factors of
production—all as perceived by the decision maker who must try to
predict these elements over a span of the future, given limited knowl-
edge even of the past and the necessity of facing risk and uncer-
tainty.24 This list does not include current and past profits, but then the
determinants that it does include are not directly observable (which is
usually the case for variables required by purely theoretical analysis).
In any empirical application, proxy variables must be used, and profits
are frequently cast in this role. It has been argued that this lacks
theoretical justification, at least "at the level of the individual firm
with free access to capital markets," but with the qualification that "it
is possible that the supply of money capital may itself be a function of
current profits. ... Forlack of better information, investors of funds
may be guided considerably by current and past profits in their esti-
mates of the return and risk on contemplated investment. One might
24SeeRobert Eisner and Robert H. Strotz, "Determinants of Business Investment," in Commis-
sion on Money and Credit, impactsofMonetary Policy, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963, Chaps. I and
II; and Robert Eisner, "The Aggregate Investment Function," international Encyclopedia of the
SocialSciences, 1968, Vol. 8, pp. 185—94.Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 619
expect that in the case of large firms, however, it would pay the market
to sustain the cost of securing better information." 25
Asa practical proposition, in a world of imperfect and costly infor-
mation, the guiding role of past and present profit experience in the
formation of profit expectations could well be considerable. But this,
in any event, is a hypothesis about empirical regularities, and its
validity can only be tested against the data; it cannot be determined
on a priori grounds. It is true that the past may offer no relevant infor-
mation for the basic decision on whether or not a new investment proj-
ect is worth undertaking, and that such judgments should probably
seldom be strongly affected by the record on profits. However, in addi-
tion to this basic decision there are subsidiary decisions, including a
major one that concerns the choice of the proper time for the imple-
mentation of an investment project that has already been approved.
This timing decision is likely to depend more on profits. This is so inas-
much as the net impact of changes in sales and in cost-price relations
registers in the financial record which the firm uses to appraise its cur-
rent and near prospects.
Lags may be expected to occur in this process, if only because it
takes time for the firm to evaluate changes in its income and expendi-
ture flows, but such lags need not be long and may be quite variable,
even if the influence of profits were strong. Thus it is conceivable that
some firms treat their current profits, which were realized on past in-
vestments, as unbiased estimates of profits expected from planned in-
vestments. Then, for them, current profits alone would be decisive, the
variability of the underlying conditions being such that historical ex-
perience is considered no longer relevant.26 In other cases, however,
past experience may, on the contrary, carry considerable weight in the
implementation of investment decisions. Implementation may be de-
layed until past changes add up to trends on which expectations can
more safely be based. This would be so where short-term changes are
viewed as too volatile to be relied upon, but longer changes are not.
Limited information and discounting for risk and uncertainty would
work in this direction.
There are no good reasons for expecting much uniformity in these
25Eisner and Strotz, "Determinants," pp. 124—25.
26 Compare the "implicit expectations"analysis in Edwin S. Mills, Price,Oulpul, andInventory
Policy,New York, 1962,Chap.3.620 Orders and Re'ated Processes During Business Cycles
relations across different industries, types of investment projects,
business conditions, etc. However, firms may often view the move-
ments in industry- and economywide aggregates as more "permanent"
than deviating movements in their own microdata for the same varia-
bles (e.g., sales).27 If this is so in the present context, then the in-
fluence on business investment of aggregateprofitsmay well be con-
siderably stronger than the presumably varying relationships among
the corresponding microvariables would seem to imply.
A different reason for viewing profits as a determinant of investment
liesin any preferences for internal financing that may exist.If
imperfections are present in the capital market, such preferences ac-
quire an objective basis. This argument may appear unconvincing,
particularly for the large corporations which usually have easy access
to sources of money capital. It also implicitly gives more weight to
cash flow, a more comprehensive factor than (net) profits.28
Data on profit margins (profits before taxes per dollar of sales, R/S)
will now be used, to de-emphasize the financial aspect of profits and to
focus instead on the role of profits as an indicator of price-cost rela-
tions and of prospects for investment projects. This also serves to
make some allowance for the role of sales. Chart 12-12 compares the
reference cycle patterns for R/S with those for new investment orders
and contracts, OC. The R/S series refers to all corporations and is
compiled by the Federal Trade Commission—Securities and Exchange
Commission; the OC series is familiar from Chapters 9 and 10.
Given moderately rising marginal cost curves and fairly rigid short-
run price behavior in the manufacturing sector, profits would tend to
be a positive function of sales, since fluctuations in sales are paralleled
by changes in the degree of capacity utilization. However valid this
common explanation, positive correlations between profits and sales
are often observed and accepted as a feature of short-term business
developments. But R is definitely much more variable than S; there-
fore, the R/S ratios reflect much more the changes in R than in S. In-
deed, the cyclical patterns for RIS in Chart 12-12 strongly resemble
27This hypothesis was found by Eisner to be consistent with his regression estimates of investment
functions based on firm and industry data from the McGraw-Hill capital expenditure surveys. See
references in note 24 above and in Chapter 10, note 46.
28The two variables are as a rule highly correlated in the short run. There is, however, some
evidence that profits are more effective than cash flow ininfluencinginvestment commitments
(Chapter 10).120—
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the corresponding patterns for total after-tax profits in Chart 12-11.
They show that forces causing deterioration (from the producer's
point of view) of cost-price relations can become effective enough in
the mid-stages of a business expansion to result in an early downturn
in profit margins. The peaks in the patterns for R/S fall in stage III
(except in the 1949—54 cycle when the series had two peaks, the first
in stage II, which was early in the Korean War period, and the second,
much lower one in stage V). Thus RIS led by two long cycle-stages
relative to the recent peaks in aggregate economic activity and by one
or two stages relative to the peaks in new investment orders and con-
tracts, OC.
The tendency of RIS to lead at troughs is barely evident in the pat-
C
Chart 12-12
Reference Cycle Patterns in New Capital Appropriations,
NewinvestmentOrders and Contracts, and Profits per
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terns, nor does RIS turn up ahead of OC; at the 1961 recovery the
opposite was, in fact, the case.
New capital appropriations by manufacturers (App) had larger ampli-
tudes of rise and fall than OC in the two business cycles covered by
these data (1954—61). They also led OC at peaks by one cycle-stage,
as can be seen by comparing the corresponding patterns in the two
columns of Chart 12-12. At peaks in R/S, capital appropriations had
either roughly coincident or lagging timing, but they definitely led at the
1961 trough.29
Profits and profit margins, then, have patterns of cyclical behavior
that are substantially similar to the patterns of durable goods orders
and investment commitments. The timing of these series is either
approximately simultaneous or, at least at peaks, it is the profit varia-
bles that lead On the aggregate level, considering the chain of in-
fluence that is running in the opposite direction, i.e., from orders to
profits, it would seem that the time dimension of this feedback effect is
likely to be quite different. Sustained increases in new orders will be
translated into higher gross revenues and probably also into higher net
revenues, while sustained decreases will have the contrary effects.
Since the realization and recording of profits takes time, the process
can be expected to involve significant lags.3° This is particularly true of
investment orders—contracts, which often require considerable time to
be taken into production, executed, and paid for—facts suggesting that
these commitments can generate profits only with distributed and fre-
quently long lags. Since our data provide no evidence of such lags of
profits, a tentative inference from them is that in the short run the
effect of profits on orders and contracts is stronger than the feedback
29SeeThomas M. Stanback, Jr., and Howard Sherman,"Cyclical Behaviorof Profits, Appropria-
tions and Expenditures: Some Aspects of the investment Process," Proceedingsof the Business
and Economic Statistics Section, AmericanStatistical Association annual meeting, September 1962,
pp. 274—86. Using quarterly data for 1953—61 (NICB series on appropriations and FTC-SEC series
on profits), Stanback and Sherman concluded (p. 284) that "there appears to be a significant simi-
larity in the patterns of cyclical movements in profits and appropriations for the aggregate and
most of the industry series. Among the industry series conformity is highest with appropriations
lagged one quarter in over half of the cases, with coincident timing in most of the remainder.
There is some evidence ... thatthe relationship between the two variables is more consistent at
downturns than at upturns. The relationship also improves when rises or declines in profits are
widespread among the various manufacturing industries."
30Notethat this refers directly to the firms that receive orders, whereas the earlier argument
about the likelihood of relatively short lags in the chain of influence running from realized profits to
investment commitments referred to the behavior of the firms that place orders. For the aggregate of
all firms, of course, orders received equal orders placed; hence, no operational distinction can be
made along these lines.Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 623
effect running in the opposite direction. However, profits and invest-
ment commitments may well be subject to common influences and they
doubtless interact; hence, one must beware of any simple assertions
of unidirectional causal relations among these variables.
New Orders Received and Capital Appropriations and Outlays
A sustained rise in demand will tend to increase profits and stimu-
late expectations and investment, but the process, as suggested above,
is probably often a protracted one. Thus the curves in Chart 12-13 sug-
gest that cyclical fluctuations in industry expenditures on plant and
equipment (1) follow with long lags the fluctuations in new orders for
products of the given industry (N).31 A positive association between N
and I seems to exist in each of the several major manufacturing indus-
tries covered, but at times the lags are so tong that the series appear to
be related in an almost inverted fashion (see the graphs for primary
metals in 1958—61 or for electrical machinery in 1953—55). At times,
too, new orders experienced short cyclical movements which could not
be matched with similar lagged movements in the corresponding invest-
ment outlay series (e.g., the 1952—53 rise in primary metals orders).
Clearly, investment in plant and equipment depends on various
other factors in addition to the course of demand for the investor's out-
put. Hence, one would not expect it to be closely related to new or-
ders, and in fact the relations are not close. Nevertheless, the cyclical
fluctuations in the paired series show a high degree of conformity, as
indicated by a comparison of the numbers of turns covered and
matched. The matched peaks and troughs represent 88 per cent of all
turning points covered in the expenditure series and 80 per cent of
those covered in the new-order series. All but three of the forty-six
timing comparisons made, or 93 per cent, were leads of orders. By
industries, the mean leads vary from two to three quarters, except for
one lead of 11 months in primary metals. On the average for eleven
industries, new orders led expenditures by 8 months, with a mean de-
viation of 4 months. The series on investment expenditures show a
preponderance of lags at business cycle troughs, but at peaks the
series are for the most part roughly coincident and not very regular,
with leads nearly as frequent as lags.
31Thisanalysis is based on the major-industry data published prior to the 1963 revision of the
industry Survey series for new orders, etc.624 Orders and ReLated Processes During Business Cycles
Chart 12-13
New Orders Received and Expenditures on Plant and
Equipment, Seven Major Manufacturing Industries,
1948—6 1
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Neworders received by such industries as nonelectrical machinery
and nonautomotive transportation equipment reflect decisions to ac-
quire capital goods by private domestic producers. Outlays on such
goods are a major component of equipment expenditures. It is of
interest to note that the relations between new orders and fixed-invest-
ment outlays are closer for these industries (especially nonelectrical626 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
Chart 12-13 (concluded)
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Note:Shaded areas represent business cycle contractions; unshaded areas, expan-
sions. Dots identify peaks and troughs of specific cycles; circles identify minor turns or
retardations.
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission and U.S. Department of Commerce,
Office of Business Economics.
machinery) than for the others. The weakest association is found for
motor vehicles in the period approximately through 1954.32
32Inthese years, mainly under the impact of heavy defense spending, new orders and shipments for
the motor vehicles industry followed considerably different time-paths (see Chart 4-3; for civilian
motor vehicles these N and S series are nearly alike). Plaut and equipment outlays of motor vehicle
manufacturers were then much better correlated with S than with N. Since 1955, N and S for this
group moved rather closely together, and both series show a definite association with fixed-invest-
ment expenditures.Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 627
The finding that cyclical movements in incoming business typically
begin and end several months ahead of the corresponding movements
in plant and equipment expenditures becomes more significant when
these leads are either as long or longer than the intervals between
investment decisions and expenditures. The evidence appears in com-
parisons of the OBE series on new orders with data from NICB new
capital appropriations, and with the OBE-SEC figures on capital out-
lays. Chart 12-14 presents the sequences of related turning points in
these series. It suggests a tendency for appropriations (App) to lag be-
hind orders received by the same industry (N), though the timing re-
lations between these variables are rather irregular. In 1953—61, App
lagged behind N in fourteen instances, but there were as many as nine
coincidences. Although there were only four leads ofApp over N, they
were long enough to offset the lags in two industries and to outweigh
them in one. Capital outlays (I) lagged behind N and App in each in-
dustry by similar intervals. As shown by the accompanying figures,
these intervals averaged six to ten months for most industries.




Prim.Elec. exc. andport.Allied Mill
Met.Mach.Elec.Equip.Equip.Prod. Prod.
N and App —4.2—0.8 0.0+2.0 —5.2 0.0 —2.4
App and 1 —9.6—6.8 —10.2—6.6 —4.0—10.0 —7.8
N and I —13.8 —7.8 —9.0—6.0 —8.0 —9.0 —10.2
Limitations of materials and technique prohibit any firm inferences
from these figures. But they seem at least consistent with the notion
that sufficiently pronounced and prolonged expansions in new orders
for manufacturers' output stimulate, and contractions discourage, the
approval and implementation of capital expenditure projects of the
companies concerned. This result is, of course, anything but surprising.
It would be expected on any version of the flexible-accelerator
hypothesis but also on the hypothesis that investment responds posi-
tively to rising and negatively to falling profits. If manufacturers'628 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
Chart 12-14
Timing of Cycles in New Orders Compared with Cycles in New
Capital Appropriations and in Plant and Equipment
















Paper and Allied Products
App
Textile-Mill Products
1953'54 '55'56 '57 '58 '59 '60 '61
Note:Identical letters denote cycle turns that can be matched. Broken lines between
points indicate retardations; broken lines at the beginning or end of the period covered
indicate uncertainty regarding the direction of cyclical movement.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics; Securities
and Exchange Commission; and National Industrial Conference Board.Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 629
profits tend to move with output and sales, the short-term expectations
of profits should be much influenced by changes in new orders, which
anticipate the movements of production. The business climate in the
period covered by these comparisons was probably not conducive to
the development of any sharp differences between the short-run and
the longer-term business outlook. It was a period in which business
conditions were mostly favorable and capacity utilization rates mostly
high; the external disturbances impinging upon the economy were rela-
tively short and not very strong, except during the Korean War. Hence,
there are good reasons why the trends in new orders, through their
effects upon actual and anticipated profits, should have had a major
influence on the industrial producers' decisions regarding investment
in plant and equipment.
Diffusion Indexes for Orders, Profits, and In vestment
Chart 12-15 assembles some diffusion indexes based on series for
the variables now under discussion: new capital appropriations (App),
new orders for durable goods (N), corporate profits (R), and business
expenditures on plant and equipment (I). These indexes show the per-
centages of series in the given group that undergo expansion; they are
based on moving averages, like the indexes in Chart 12-6, but unlike
the latter are not cumulated.
The monthly index for N includes 36 series for durable goods in-
dustries and is presented in the form of percentages of series expand-
ing over nine-month spans.33 There is a very definite correspondence of
cyclical movements in this index and in the diffusion index of new
capital appropriations (compare the first two curves in Chart 12-15).
The index for appropriations, being quarterly,is of course con-
siderably smoother than the monthly index for orders, but the two
show similar broad fluctuations of approximately coincident timing.34
Also included in Chart 12-15 is a diffusion index of profits based on
the quarterly financial reports of large numbers of manufacturing cor-
"Theindex is plottedin the sixth month of the span. Its component series are not separately pub-
lished, but the index itself is released regularly and charted in the monthly BusinessConditions
Digest (Bureauof the Census). The other index series shown in Chart 12-15 are published in the
same source. All series are seasonally adjusted. I am indebted to the Bureau of the Census for the
historicaldata forthe series.
The appropriations index is based onthree-quarterchangesandplotted in the third month of the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 631
porations (approximately 600 in the fifties, presently about 1,000).
This index refers to one-quarter spans and thus involves no smoothing
(it is plotted in the first month of the second quarter). It fluctuates
within a relatively narrow range, most of the time between 35 and 65
per cent and never beyond the 2 5—75 per cent band, which primarily re-
flects the large size of the samples covered.35 Nevertheless, these per-
centages, too, show clusters of locally high values in the expansion
years (1950, 1955, 1958—59, and 1961) and oflocallylowvaluesinthe
recession or retardation periods (1949, 1951, 1953, 1957—58, 1960,
1962, and 1967). And the timing of these maxima and minima tends to
be roughly synchronous with the timing of the corresponding values in
the indexes for new orders and capital appropriations.
The index shown on the last line of Chart 12-15 is based on the
quarterly surveys of business expenditures on new plant and equip-
ment conducted by the Department of Commerce—Securities and Ex-
change Commission (OBE-SEC). It has one-quarter spans and is
plotted in the first month of the second quarter. Since it is not smoothed
and is calculated from a limited number of industry series, it shows
relatively frequent, large, and irregular oscillations, but its longer,
cyclical movements are for the most part clearly recognizable. These
movements are much earlier than those in the corresponding aggregate
of business fixed-capital outlays. The latter shows roughly coincident
timing at business cycle peaks and short lags at troughs, while the dif-
fusion index leads at peaks by long, and at troughs by intermediate or
short, intervals.36 However, the diffusion indexes for new investment
commitments are even earlier leaders than those for expenditures, re-
flecting the timing sequence of the corresponding aggregates. The
cyclical reversals in the percentage-expanding series for business capi-
tal outlays lag systematically behind the reversals in the indexes for
new capital appropriations and new orders for durable goods (curves 1,
2, and 4 in Chart 12-15). The lags relative to the appropriations index
average 8.5 months at peaks and 6 months at troughs in the period
For a given type of economic process, unit of analysis, etc., it is clearly far more likely that 10
compoueat series wouldallexpand or contract simultaneously than that 500 would do so. But here
there are other sources of difference as well, since the indexes refer to different variables and units
(industries, firms).
Theleads of the index at peaks ranged from 13 to 27 months and averaged about 20 months; the
leads at troughs ranged from I to 7 months and averaged about 4 months.632 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
1954—61; the lags relative to the new-order index average 6 months at
peaks and nearly 5 months at troughs in the period 1950—61
MaterialsPurchases, Inventory Changes, and Credit Conditions
Moore has suggested that "tight credit conditions and piling up of in-
ventories" contribute to the early declines in orders during business
expansions, along with "unfavorable cost-price relations." 38Thelast
factor was considered in the previous sections; the first two factors
will be given some attention now.
New orders for materials increase sharply in the initial stage of a
business expansion. Total stocks of purchased materials usually con-
tinue to decline in this stage, but the rate of disinvestment begins
decreasing late in the contraction. At that time, new orders turn up for
many products of the firms holding the inventories, giving rise to or
reinforcing expectations of an upswing in demand. Then, an increasing
number of firms, facing the upswing, hasten to end further disinvest-
ment and to build up their working inventories. Shipments of materials
rise too, but at a lower rate than new orders, so that producers' order
books lengthen, i.e., commitments to supply materials increase. Pur-
chasers, however, not only add to their outstanding orders but
presently succeed in increasing their stocks on hand. In fact, the largest
increases in these stocks take place early in expansion, in stage-to-
stage intervals 1—11 and 11—111.
All this is indicated by the patterns in the first two columns of Chart
12-16, which are based in part on grouped pre-1963 OBE data on new
orders and shipments. The patterns for the purchased materials inven-
tories (M) refer to the Commerce series in book values.39 Studies of the
cyclical behavior of inventories support this analysis.4°
In the late stages of expansion, the pace of increases in demand
typically slackens. Though it is by no means demonstrated, it is plaus-
ible that the very increases in inventories which occurred during the
All in all,these comparisons yield twelvelagsof the investment expenditures index and one
caseof coincidence. But the lags, while persistent, varied considerably in length (from Ito 13
months). It should be noted that some of the dates involved in these observations represent
marginal and inevitably uncertain selections.
"Leading and Confirming Indicators," p. 65. He adds that "opposite conditions are associated
with the early upturns in new orders during contractions."
The stage-to-stage changes in inventories are plotted at points in time separating the
stages (the values of the reference cycle patterns in M are centered on the stage intervals).
See Chapter 8 for references to the work by Abramovitz, Stanback, and others, and for an ac-























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































s634 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
recovery on an impressive scale now act as a deterrent against further
massive stockpiling. Certainly pronounced retardations are evident in
inventory fluctuations. The stage-to-stage changes in materials inven-
tories form an almost inverted pattern relative to that of inventories
proper in Chart 12-16. Thus, in the second half of expansion new or-
ders for materials begin to decline, while output and deliveries of ma-
terials flatten out. Inventories continue to rise throughout the expan-
sion but at a declining rate; inventory investment turns down early.
Inventory purchases and financing are a major source of the demand
for business loans, which brings up a point about the influence of credit
conditions. From stage to stage of the business cycle, the pattern of
movement in commercial bank loans (L) has a very similar appearance
to the course followed by purchased-material inventories (compare the
diagrams for totals and changes in the two middle columns of Chart
The similarity extends to the• patterns of stage-to-stage
changes (L and M). The differences between the patterns are in part of
technical origin and not essential as far as the cyclical aspect of this
relation is concerned.42
The patterns in bank interest rates on short-term business loans, i (a
quarterly series of the Federal Reserve Board), also bear a strong
family resemblance to the patterns in L and M. (Compare the cor-
responding diagrams in the last three columns of Chart 12-16.) These
high positive correlations in each successive cycle among inventories,
loans, and interest rates indicate strong influences arising from shifts
of demand. To finance the net additions to inventories (and for other
business purposes), increasing amounts of loans are sought, which
drives up interest rates. Banks strive to satisfy the loan demands of
regular customers as far as possible, even when funds are scarce.43
The patterns for commercial bank loans are based on the monthly FRB series for totalloansof
reporting member banks. Inventory borrowingis knowntorepresent a large partof total business
borrowing and a major use of short-termbankcredit. Close associations between manufacturers' in-
ventories and short-term bank loans have been shown and analyzed in Doris M. Eisemann, "Manu-
facturers' Inventory Cycles and Monetary Policy," Journalof the American Statistical Association,
September 1958, pp. 680—88.
42Themost significant difference observable is that loans often start rising earlier than inven-
tories and start declining later. The average expansion period in the chart is VIL—VI for loans (L)
and Il—V for inventories (M). This seems largely due to trend differences, which are only partially
eliminated by the adopted technique since the patterns abstract from the intercycle but retain the
intracycle trend components. The timing discrepancies are decreased when first differences in the
patterns are calculated to obtain the diagrams forand a step that further reduces the effect
of trends.
They do so by reducing excess reserves, selling securities, and borrowing. (See Phillip Cagan,
"Interest Rates and Bank Reserves—A Reinterpretation of the Statistical Association," Jack M.Patterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 635
But one can also see in these patterns some elements of a simple nega-
tive relation between price and quantity demanded. The largest de-
creases in the interest rates occur in mid- or late contraction, and
the lowest levels of the rates are observed at the end of the downswing
and early in the recovery. The credit ease may contribute to the fact
that new orders for materials firm up shortly before the business trough
and show the highest rate of rise between the first two stages of expan-
sion (1—11), while and both reach their peaks in the interval
Il—Ill.Again,the largest increases in the bank interest rates
occur in mid-expansion, in the stage intervals 11—111 and III—IV, a
timing which agrees with that of the early weaknesses or declines in
new orders and with slowdowns in the rate of borrowing and inventory
investment.
Forward Buying and Supply Conditions
The early spurts of new orders in postwar business recoveries,
visible in the patterns for durable goods and the market category of ma-
terials (Charts 12-1 and 12-16), have been accompanied by definite
shifts toward slower deliveries by the "vendors." The graphs of
cyclical movements in the vendor performance index44 show in most
cases an increase between stages VII and II (Chart 12-17). Thus, ac-
cording to a sample of purchasing agents, suppliers have increasingly
quoted longer times to delivery even before the general business up-
turn. The post-Korean patterns show the largest values of this index
in the expansion stages 11 and III and relatively low values around the
business peaks and in contractions.
The increase in the quoted lead times to delivery induces, with
short lags, a protective reaction on the part of the industrial pur-
chasers. Thus, in the initial stages of business expansions more com-
panies report ordering at least sixty days in advance of anticipated
needs than at other times, according to survey data of the National
Guttentagand PhillipCagan, eds., Essayson interest Rates, NewYork, NBER, 1969, Vol. 1,
pp.223—7 1.) Elsewhere Cagan has shown that interest rates on bank loans, along with other rates,
have a generally lagged timing at business cycle turns, but that the lags have become shorter and less
differentiated over the years, indicating increasing sensitivity of the financial markets to cyclical
business developments; see his "Changes in the Cyclical Behavior of Interest Rates," Review of
Economics and Statistics, August 1966, reprinted as Occasional Paper 100, New York, NBER,
1966.
This index, based on the monthly survey of members of the Purchasing Agents Association of
Chicago, was introduced in Chapter 8 (see Chart 8-2 and text).112 0
Months
a ChicagoPurchasing Agents Association.
bNationalAssociation of Purchasing Agents.
COBE-Census.Deviations from cycle base.
Association of Purchasing Agents (Chart 12-17). The patterns for this
buying policy index rise fairly sharply to their highest relative standings
in stages III and IV, then decline similarly to level off before the end of
contraction.45
Fora discussion of a related purchasing policy index of the PAA of Chicago, see Chart 8-2
andtext in Chapter8.
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Chart 12-17
Reference Cycle Patterns in Indexes of Vendor Performance
and Buying Policy and Changes in Unfilled Orders, 1949—6 1
Vendor performance, per cent
ofcompanies reporting
slower deliverieso
Buying policy, prod. mils.
per cenl of componies
reporting commitments
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Delivery slowdowns and increases in backlogs of unfilled sales
orders are symptoms of rising demand pressures as seen from the
suppliers' side; increases in the average time covered and total amounts
of outstanding purchase orders are the corresponding symptoms as
seen from the buyers' side. Changes in unfilled orders (outstanding
orders) for durable goods are shown in the patterns of deviations from
the cycle base (last column of Chart 12-17). These patterns certainly
resemble the others in the chart, particularly those of the vendor per-
formance index. The largest cyclical increases in backlogs occurred
at mid-expansion or earlier, in stages II and III; the largest decreases,
shortly alter the peak of business activity, in stages VI and VII.
It is an important fact that these indicators of relative demand
pressure start declining so early during a business expansion and start
rising so early during a contraction or recovery. Well before the general
downturn, the rate and scope of the rise in demand (new orders) begin
to decline, and this reduces first the growth and then the level of un-
completed orders and contracts. The decline in unfilled orders is ac-
companied by speedier deliveries, which causes firms to reduce
forward buying of materials and parts. The first signs of weakness may
be connected with residential construction or new investment com-
mitments of the business sector, but suppliers of consumer goods may
be involved as well.46 Stronger efforts are then made to adjust inven-
tories downward, and investment in inventories begins declining (al-
though total stocks on hand still increase). Mutatis mutandis, analogous
(but not symmetrical) developments tend to accompany the process
of recovery.
Summary
Most reference cycle patterns for new orders for durable goods register
leads that vary from one to three cycle-stages. Contrasts between
business contractions of different severity, and between business
expansions of different vigor, are strongly reflected in the amplitudes
of these patterns. Reference cycle patterns for production show smaller
amplitudes than the corresponding constructs for new orders, and a
See ArthurF. Burns,"Business Cycles," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,
1968,Vol. 2, pp.238—39,for an account of these components of the "gathering forces of recession."638 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
more nearly coincident timing. The patterns for unfilled orders demon-
strate that in business cycles with vigorous expansions the typical
sequence is first a rapid rise in the backlog and then an early and slow
decline continuing through the contraction stages. By contrast, in
"weak" cycles that fail to include a full-grown boom, the backlog rise
is smaller and slower, often reaching its highest point in the peak
stage.
New orders and contracts for plant and equipment attained their
highest cyclical standing at or after the midpoint of recent business
expansions, in stage III or IV; but shipments and installations, as
well as the corresponding capital outlays, continued to rise until the
peak or the early-recession stage (V or VI). While new investment
commitments had their lowest cyclical standing either in mid-con-
traction or in the next stage (VII or VIII), investment realizations,
whether measured by the value of output or expenditures, had theirs
in the trough stage. The amplitudes of rise and fall over the business
cycle, as shown by the typical patterns, are considerably larger in
fixed-investment commitments than in realizations.
The evidence for the period between the two world wars, which
is rather fragmentary, suggests that the timing of new orders was then
less often leading and more often coincident than in the post-World
War II cycles; this is so according to the patterns for durable goods
and, particularly, for such capital goods as machine tools. To the ex-
tent that this represents a systematic change, it can be related to
(1) the lead of manufacturing output at peaks in recent business cycles
(in the past, when manufacturing had greater weight in the economy,
declines in this sector had stronger and prompter effects and therefore
more nearly coincident timing); (2) the long lags of production behind
new orders at the recessions of the 1940's and 1950's because of very
large accumulations of unfilled order backlogs in the preceding ex-
pansions.
The reference cycle patterns in new orders of durable goods manu-
facturers and in corporate profits after taxes show marked similarities,
and so do the patterns in corporate profit margins and in new invest-
ment commitments (orders and contracts and capital appropriations).
In the postwar cycles for which these measures are available, profit
margins turned down earlier than investment commitments.
The influence of profits may be due to their acting as proxies forPatterns and Diffusion of Cyclical Movements 639
changes in internal funds, cost-price relationships, and business
expectations, so that the role of this variable, even though apparently
strong, is ambiguous. However, the use of profit margins presumably
helps to reduce the financial aspect and to bring out more strongly
the other aspects of the profit-investment relationship.
Orders and profits may well be jointly determined by other factors,
and they certainly interact. Sustained increases (decreases) in new
orders received are apt to be translated, via output and sales, into
higher (lower) profits. However, this process is likely to involve
relatively long lags of profits behind orders received, whereas the
causal chain that "starts" with profits suggests that profits should
lead or coincide with orders placed. For the aggregate of all firms the
distinction between orders received and placed is immaterial. The fact
that aggregate profits seldom lag but frequently lead or coincide with
orders suggests that the influence of profits on orders is the stronger
one.
The cyclical fluctuations in industry expenditures on plant and equip-
ment tend to follow with long lags the more pronounced and prolonged
expansions and contractions in new orders received by the given in-
dustry. New capital appropriations tend to coincide approximately
with, or lag shortly behind, these orders, for most of the major indus-
tries covered. These results are consistent with both the flexible ac-
celerator and the profits hypotheses about investment determination.
New orders for materials usually turn up ahead of the business cycle
trough, then increase sharply in the initial stage of expansion, while
stocks still decline but at considerably lower rates. Although ship-
ments of materials rise more slowly than orders, purchasers soon
succeed in adding not only to their stocks on order but also to stocks
on hand. In the later stages of business expansion, there is typically a
retardation in purchasing, which may partly represent reactions to
the earlier massive stockpiling. Both the levels and stage-to-stage
changes in the cyclical patterns for commercial bank loans and bank
interest rates on short-term business loans resemble quite well the
patterns for purchased-material stocks. These relations reflect the
shifts in demand for bank credit by business and the effects of such
shifts on interest rates. But there is also evidence that the largest
increases (decreases) in bank interest rates occur in mid-expansion
(mid-contraction), and this may contribute to the similar timing of the640 Orders and Related Processes During Business Cycles
first declines (rises) in purchases of materials and parts. Still another
reason for such early declines in new orders during business expan-
sions lies in the concurrent reductions of delivery lags and of forward
buying.
Diffusion indexes show that the percentage of industries with rising
new orders typically turns up early in a business contraction and turns
down early in an expansion. The scope of cyclical movements in the
demand for industrial outputs evidently undergoes large fluctuations
of its own that lead the fluctuations in aggregate demand by long inter-
vals. The percentage-expanding indexes for new orders received by
durable goods industries show roughly coincident timing with the in-
dexes for new investment commitments and profits. Such diffusion
series based on leading indicators can be particularly helpful in re-
vealing and locating the strengths and weaknesses that often develop
early in business contractions and expansions. The percentage-ex-
panding indexes for production and business capital outlays lag behind
those for new orders and capital appropriations and profits (although
they, too, have considerably earlier timing than the corresponding
aggregates of output and investment expenditures).